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THE LIMITED-ACCESS HIGHWAY
FROM A LAWYER'S VIEWPOINT
WILKIE CUNNYNGHAM*
For thousands of years before roughly 1910, civilizations traveled
leisurely by animal-drawn vehicles. Since an ox-cart or wagon could go
almost anywhere across field or countryside (provided farming operations
were not unduly interfered with), the problem of locating trails or roads
was simple, and usually solved by the respective owners through whose
lands they went.1 Construction, if any, was inexpensive and more often
considered a private neighborhood project than a public or governmental
function.
But as motor vehicles came into common use, the transportation picture
in the United States began changing. Within a decade trips of 50 or 100
miles became as common as 5 or 10 miles had been before. Average speeds
of 3 to 5 miles an hour jumped to 10 and even 20 miles per hour.2
Next, the public began demanding a much better road for the new
vehicle. This pressure produced in 1916 a legal revolution in highway
matters-the Federal Aid Act, 39 Stat. 355, approved July 11, 1916. One-
half of the cost of constructing roads would be contributed from federal
funds, provided certain conditions were complied with., In the next few
*Assistant Attorney, Missouri State Highway Department, Jefferson City.
A.B., B.Ped., Scarritt-Morrisville College, LL.B., University of Missouri.
1. Mo. REv. STAT. § 8481 (1939) still provides that: "Any person wishing
to cultivate or enclose land through which any road may run may petition the
county court... for permission to turn such road on his own land or on the land
of any other person-consenting thereto. . . ." But in common practice, road loca-
tions were shifted by some traveler's simply opening "gaps" in the right-of-way
fence and driving out across the adjoining field "in order to avoid a mudhole" in
the old road, or by the landowner's "straightening his fence" or changing drainage,
as in California Special Road District v. Bueker, 221 Mo. App. 435, 439, 441, 282
S. W. 2d 71 (1926).
2. State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517, 524, 102 S. W. 483 (1907), upheld a con-
viction for violating the maximum speed limit of 9 miles per hour for all highways
in Missouri-the automobile "is of unusual shape and form, is capable of high rate
of speed, and produces a puffing noise when in motion. All this makes such a horse-
less vehicle a source of danger to persons traveling upon the highway in vehicles
drawn by horses."
3. Some important pioneering was done here on a device, now very common,
whereby the federal government can leave to the independent states all jurisdiction
and control over any field of government into, which the central government does
not wish to, or may not legally enter, but nevertheless, allows it to 6ontrol all
1
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years most of the states created state highway departments to receive
"Federal aid" and voted large bond issues to raise state funds to match the
promised federal funds 4
But always the imagination, initiative, ingenuity, and model improve-
ments of the private motor vehicle manufacturer, as well as the ever
increasing demands of the public, have kept well ahead of the public high-
way official. By 1942 our American civilization had become so geared to,
and dependent upon, the motor vehicle that it was almost paralyzed by
only a limited rationing of gasoline and tires. The total number of vehicles,
their average size, speed, and daily mileage, as well as the congestion of
roadside business (so-called "ribbon development"), have already exceeded
the wildest dreams of the decade when our most important highways were
conceived and built. And they continue to increase. No one can now
prophesy when and what the ultimate will be. But already the full safe-
capacity of many of our key highways during certain hours and periods
has been reached or exceeded, and the point of diminishing returns from
these expensive service facilities is being passed.
However, improvements in vehicles and increase public demand always
result, sooner or later, in better highways. The most important recent ad-
vance is the limited-access "highway. Though the autobam was well known
the actions of the states. It simply collects enough federal taxes from the citizens
of all the states so that it can offer to return certain amounts to those states which
enact or enforce a particular state law as desired by the federal Government, its
officers, or employees. The effectiveness of such government through go-between
states is illustrated in Section 16 of the Centennial Road Law, Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 8754 (1939), by which: "The (State Highway) Commission is hereby directed
to comply with the provisions of any act of Congress providing for the distribu-
tion and expenditure of funds of the United States appropriated by Congress for
highway construction, and to comply with any of the rules or conditions made by
the bureau of public roads in the department of agriculture, or other branch of the
United States Government . . . in order to secure to the State of Missouri funds
allotted to this State by the United States Government for highway construction."
This section, under the majority opinion in Logan v. State Highway Commission,
330 Mo. 1213, 52 S. W. 2d 989 (1932), directs the commission to violate a later
section (Mo. REv. STAT. § 8768 (1939)) in the same law, provided such violation
is made a condition for getting some additional federal money; e.g., the location of a
secondary highway by statute in 1921 (and by the Constitutional Amendment,
Art. IV, § 44a, which ii 1928 adopted that location of "secondary highways as
designated and laid out under existing law") might, according to the minority
opinion, be made ,"wholly subject to the will or caprice of the Federal (or State)
authorities" by merely producing a letter signed by some federal employee. See
Mo. CorisT. Art. IV, § 30 3d; Art. III, § 38; Art. VI, § 16 (1945); Ind. Acts. 1947,
Ch. 377, p. 1509.
4. For the succession of more important legal milestones which mark in Mis-
souri the development of the motor vehicle, see Appendix, p. 42, following.
[Vol. 13
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THE LIMITED-ACCESS HIGHWAY
in Germany before the recent war, the limited-access highway has begun
to really develop in America only in the last 10 years, and has been greatly
retarded during this period by the almost complete stoppage of highway
construction by World 'War II. In all the United States there are only a
few hundred miles of it as yet.5 There are none in the State of Missouri.6
1. WHAT IS A LIMITED-AccEss HIGHWAY?
Many of those in control of our highways and streets have little, if
any, conception of what a limited-access highway is, what it is intended to
accomplish, and what engineering, legal, economic, and social problems
may be connected with it. Yet, in the next few years thousands of miles
of this new highway will appear all through the states.
The goal toward which the limited-access highway aims is an un-
obstructed, safer, faster, less congested, and more efficient highway, with
the driver's roadway freed from:
(1) Danger of headlight glare and other vehicles coming at him
head-on in his" traffic lane.
(2) Slowing, stopping, and congestion from traffic on intersecting
highways blocking his roadway.
(3) Other vehicles suddenly cutting in front of him, coming out
of and going into abutting property, or turning into or out of
other highways.
These various results are accomplished by a multi-lane highway with:
5. Frank C. Balfour, in an address on "Effect of Freeway Development on
Adjoining Land Values in California," delivered in New York City before the 1947
Meeting of the American Association of State Highway Officials, said: 'Long before
our State Highway Department embarked on the program of planning and con-
structing limited freeways, planners and subdividers with outstanding foresight were
thinking along the same lines' and transformed their thoughts into action and
accomplishment." He cited as examples the Park-Presidio and Junipero Serra
Boulevards in San Francisco, the Santa Anita Oaks subdivision along Foothills
Boulevard, and otlher private developments along Crenshaw, Long Beach, Sepulveda,
and Ventura Boulevards in or near Los Angeles.
6. Unless abutting landowners have had their legal right to construct and
use their own entrances for access to the 3.286-mile Oakland Express in St. Louis
extinguished by the statute of limitations or some other rule of law, it probably
should not be referred to as a limited-access highway. See: State ex rel. State High-
way Commission v. Hoffman, 132 S. W. 2d 27, 32 (Mo. App. 1939); Brownslow
v. O'Donoghue, 276 Fed. 636, 22 A. L: R. 939 (1921); 25 AM. Jun. Highways § 154;
Kent v. Trenton, 48 S. W. 2d 571 (Mo. App. 1932); Riggs v. Springfield, 344
Mo. 420, 126 S. W. 2d 1144 (1939) State ex rel. State Highway, Commission
v. Bailey, 234 Mo. 168, 178-180, 115 S. W. 2d 17 (1938).
19481
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(a) Central traffic lanes or "thruway"7 for through traffic, sep-
arated from "outer-roadways" in front of the abutting property
on either side for two-way local traffic and parking.
(b) No direct access to the thruway except at certain well spaced
entrances and exits connecting outer-roadways and inter-
secting highways. The thruway lanes are often elevated,
depressed, or fenced from the rest of the highway and abutting
property. The usual direct access is allowed between ,outer-
roadways and abutting property.
(c) Grade separations for intersecting highways.
(d) Thruway lanes for traffic going in opposite directions, sep-
arated and screened by a wide division strip and plantings.
Of course, every limited-access highway will not have all the above
characteristics. Local and varying conditions must always determine the
degree of approximation to this model which will be practical in each
particular case. However, an analysis of Missouri's state highway accidents,
set out hereafter, suggests that the minimum requirements for a limited..
access highway should be:
(1) All direct access from outside the highway (whether from other
highways or from abutting property) must be subject to legal
limitation-either entire or partial.
(2) All access between lanes intended for traffic going in opposite
directions inside the thruway must be subject to legal control.
II. WHY HAvF LnvumD-Acc-ss HIGHWAYS?
Is this new type highway worthy of the lawyer's (or, for that matter
anyone's) attention and study? What may we expect to get from such a
*highway? 'It is, or will shortly command such public attention that every
well informed lawyer who expects to be a leader in public affairs should be
interested in just a few facts about it.
A. It can make millions of additional productive man-hours
available to our economy and society each year.
We are all familiar with the rush-hour jam in our big cities. Cars creep
along block after block in low gear at a snail's-pace, bumper to bumper,
fender to fender, stopping and starting at each intersecting street and in-
7. The use and spelling of "thruway" was originated in New York. Other
terms are also used to designate the general type of road from right-of-way line to
right-of-way line, such as "freeway," "limited freeway," expressway," "superhigh.
way," "controlled-access highway," and "parkway."
[Vol. 13
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THE LIMITED-ACCESS HIGHWAY
numerable times in between. Honking horns and glaring faces only add to
the driver's nervous tension (and perhaps high blood pressure and early
death). Tempers are lost; paint and fenders are lost; and countless hours of
precious time are lost.
Would limiting access help? Well, it takes only 3 or 4 minutes now to
make a 1V/-mile trip on the Davidson Limited Highway in Detroit's metro-
politan area, where formerly, with unlimited access, 20 to 30 minutes were
required. The 5.8-mile Arroyo Seco limited-access highway has cut 25
minutes' driving time between Pasadena and Los Angeles. Milwaukee com-
pared a 5/8-mile limited-access section of 35th Street with 4 other adjoining
or near sections of the same length, on the same street, and which carried
about the same traffic, but allowed unlimited access. Limitation of access
raised the average speed of 13.4 miles per hour during rush hours to 31.8.
If the time saving for each vehicle each day were totaled at the end of
the year, we would get some startling figures. It has been estimated that the
Willow Run Expressway System alone will save motorists in Detroit ap-
proximately 5,000,000 man-hours each year. The total productive man-hours
which a few limited-access highways could make available to the United
States each year for economic and social gains would be astronomical. And
one of the factors most determinative of any nation's strength, wealth, and
well-being is its available man-hours.
B. It can carry up to 3 tiftes the amouznt of traffic wit&. no
increase or widening of existing trafflc-lanes.
All agree that something must be done to relieve traffic congestion on
many of our highways. It is estimated that a 6-lane limited-access highway
will carry 50,000 vehicles per day, but that it takes up to 18 lanes of un-
limited-access highway to carry the same traffic. Another estimate is that
only 400 vehicles can be accommodated per hour on a single unlimited-access
traffic-lane, whereas, 1,500 can be better accommodated on a controlled-
access lane.
C. It should reduce motor vehicle accidents
between 50% and 75%
If we look only at those highways in Missouri which are under the
jurisdiction of the State Highway Commission (and these are only a small
part of the total mileage of the state), there were 7,256 reported accidents
during the 12 months ending June 30, 1947. Of these, 1,854 were caused by
vehicles attempting to gain access to a state highway, while 1,724 were
19481
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caused by head-on collisions between vehicles going in opposite directions,
but on the same traffic-lane--or, in the year, a total of 3,578 accidents which
were occasioned, in every instance, by access being allowed either (1) from
outside the highway to a-traffic-lane occupied by another vehicle, or (2)
between lanes intended for traffic in opposite directions. 
I
That indicates V-to be exact, 49.2+%--of all accidents on Missouri's
state highways this year could have been prevented by limited-access high-
ways-231 lives, out of the 464 persons killed in those accidents, could
have been saved; 3,191 mangled bodies, and $1,348,037 of property loss pre-
vented.
After the exclusion of promiscuous entering and crossing traffic on the
%-mile section in Milwaukee, it had only 5%o as many accidents as the
average of the other 4 comparable unlimited-access sections, and the per-
sonal injury ratio was I to 27. U. S. Highway No. 1 in New Jersey parallels
the Merrit Parkway and has a reasonably comparable amount of traffic.
From 1940 to 1944 there were 103 deaths on No. 1, which allows unlimited
access, and only, 23 on the limited-access Parkway-or 4.5 times as many.
California reduced accidents 75% by limiting access on the Arroyo Seco.
Experience throughout the.United States indicates limited-access high-
ways should eliminate between 50%o and 75% of our staggering annual toll
of approximately 40,000 highway deaths, 1,450,000 non-fatal injuries, and
$2,000,000,000 of property loss.
Certainly all engineering, financing, and legal problems conriected with
limited access are worthy of study. Indeed, it is tragic that they were not
solved long ago.
III. WHAT LEGAL RIGHTS ARE THERE WHICH MAY BE AFFECTED By THE
LIMITED-AccEss HIGHWAY?
As lawyers, we are particularly ifiterested in (1) who has (2) what
(3) legal rights (and duties) which may be affected by the limited-access
highway so as to give rise to (4) legal remedies or proceedings.
A. "Damage" not same as injury to legal
righlts-damnwm asque injuria.
We "should be careful not to confuse in our minds economic matters
with legal. Financial damage is not necessarily the result of legal injury.
This all too common confusion causes almost everyone who suffers damage
in a traffic accident to ask immediately whom his claim is against-not
whether there has been a breach of some legal duty.
(Vol. 1,3
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We all are lucky enough to enjoy a great many privileges and advan.
tages which we have no legal right to demand, and which no one else owes
the legal duty to give us. The mere announcement that a particular location
has been chosen for some beneficial public -improvement may cause great
financial profit to fortunate owners of adjacent property. A later announce-
ment that the location will be changed to another community may cause
very real damage to those same owners because of depreciation in the market
value of their property, but they will not have lost any legal right.
This distinction is indicated by the phrase: Damnum absque injuria.
"'Damnum' means only harm, hurt, loss, damage; while 'injuria' comes
from 'in,' against, and 'jus,' right, and means something done against the
right of the party, producing damage, and has no reference to the fact or
amount of damage. Unless a right is violated, though there be damage, it
is 'damnum absque injuria.' "s
The lawyer's first inquiry should be: Is the right or privilege claimed
by one (and the necessary accompanying duty owed by another) recognized
in law--or is it merely fortuitous?
B. As against, the public's right to improve for highway use with elevated
roadways and overpass structures, there is generally no private
property right to light, air, view, or a particular grade.
'Generally, no one has any property right or easement of light, air, or
view across his neighbor's land. Each adjoining landowner may build just
as high and as close to the division line as he pleases. Since each has acted
within his legal rights (has violated no legal duty), any depreciation cause
in the value of the neighbor's property is damnum absque injuria. How-
8. West Virginia Transpoitation Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 50 W. Va. 611,
615, 40 S. E. 591, 592-3 (1901), where defendant had obtained pipeline business.
which plaintiff previously enjoyed, and still coveted. The, addition of "or damaged"
to many state constitution, so that they now provide that private property shall
not be (1) taken or (2) damaged without payment of just compensation, created
remedial rights against the ,state which could not have been sued without its consent
-but created no new property rights in substantive law which would thereafter be
subject to injury, and did not create corollary substantive duties upon the public
where, under similar circumstances, none would exist upon a private individual.
See Austin v. Augusta T. Ry., 108 Ga. 671, 674-676, 34 S. E. 852, 854 (1899);
Hill-Behan Lumber Co. v. State Highway Commission; 347 Mo. 671, 681, 148 S. W.
2d 499 (1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 636 (1941), and respondent's points and
authorities, 347 Mo. at 674; Thompson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 137 Mo. App.
62, 68, 119 S. W. 509 (1909); Max v. Barnard-Bolckou Drainage Dist., 326 Mo.
723, 730-733, 32 S. W. 2d 583 (1930); Smith v. St. Paul M. & M. Ry., 39 Wash.
355, 81 P. 840 (1905).
9. Austin v. Augusta T. Ry., Note 8, supra; Straup v. Rauschelbach, 217
Mo. App. 236, 239, 261 S. W. 346 (1924); Thompson v. Chicago, M. and. St. P.
Ry., 137 Mo. App. 62, 68, 119 S. W. 509 (1909).
1948]
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ever, many assume that a landowner has such easements in an abutting
highway, and that he is entitled, under the Constitution, to compensation
from the public if an overpass or elevated roadway is constructed in front
of his property, or the grade of the highway is changed. As the origin of
this idea, the early New York elevated railroad cases are usually cited.
But the obiter dictum in the Story and Lahr0 cases actually pointed out
that the abutter would not have recovered if the elevated structure had been
placed in the street as an improvement for street purposes. In the Story case
the city originally owned all the land and, as a part of the transaction selling
the abutting lot to plaintiff's predecessor in title, had subjected the street
to a covenant that the street would always be protected from non-street
use-and the erection of the railroad company's structure diverting it from
street use, violated plaintiff's legal right under the covenant. Likewise, in
the Lahr case the right-of-way was held in trust (imposed by the law under
which it was condemned) for the use of the public for highway purposes.
The exclusion of the public, and diversion of the street to the private use of
a .orporation, violated the rights of the abutter from whom the right-of-way
was condemned, authorizing him to recover all property-value loss he could
trace to the breach of trust,
The Supreme Court of the United States in the Sauer1- case pointed
out the distinction between (1) elevated structures intended to promote
the highway use and enjoyment, for which the right-of-way is held in trust,
and (2) those which divert it from that purpose, saying:
"The New York elevated railway cases . . hold that the
construction and maintenance on the street of an elevated railroad
operated by steam, iand which was not open to the public for
purposes of travel and traffic was a perversion of the street from
street uses, and imposed upon it an additional servitude, which
entitled abutting owners to damages.. Y
"... It is clear that, under the law of New York, an owner of
land abutting on the street has easements of access, light and air
as against the erection of an elevated roadway by or for a private
corporation for its own exclusive purpose, but that he has no such
easements as against the public use of the streets, or any structures
which my be erected upon the street to subserve and promote that
public use." (Emphasis mine.)
10. Story v. New York Elevated R. R., 90 N. Y. 122, 144, 145, 177 (1882),
and Lahr v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry., 104 N. Y. 268, 292 (1887).
11. Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U. S. 536, 545, 547 (1906).
[Vol. 13
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settled that regulation or limitation or traffic on a highway comes -under the
police power."5 It makes no difference how or wh&re any part of the traffic
gained access to the road-whether'from a nearby or a distanct point,
whether from abutting land or from another highway. 6
The sovereign's right to regulate traffic without liability for payment
of compensation allows, among other things, (1) diversion of traffic away
from a business location,'1 prohibiting access or cross-overs between sep-
arated traffic lanes,' designating one highway or lane to have right-of-way,
and its traffic to have precedence over intersecting highways, lanes, and
traffic,19 prohibiting left turns, 20 prohibiting or regulating parking,2' restricting
speed, weight, weight, size, and character of vehicle allowed on certain high-
ways, 22 prescribing one-way traffic, 23 creating a cul-de-sac by closing a
highway just beyond a tract of land, if access is left in one direction to the
general network of highways. 24 However, the courts of some states have
denied that one-way traffic may be enforced under the police power if,
15. 5 AM. JuL. Aut;mobiles § 16; 25 AM. Jmu Highways § 253; 40 C. J. S.
Highways § 232; City of Clayton v. Nemours, note.13; supra; Town of Oyster Bay
v. Moses, 287 N. Y. Supp. 826, 827 (2nd Dept.'1936), aff'd 273 N. Y. 631, 7 N. E.
2d 729 (1937); State v. Cox, 91 N. H. 137, 141, 16 A. 2d 508 (1940), affirmed,
312 U. S. 569 (1941); Ex Parte Kneedler, 243 Mo. 632, 641, 147 S. W. 983 (1912);
Duval Lumber Co. v. Slade, 147 Fla. 137, 2 So. 2d 371 (1941).
16. Jones Beach Boulevard Estate v. Moses, 268 N. Y. 362, 369, 197 N. E.
313, 316, 100 A.L.R. 487, 491 (1935); 39 C.J.S. Highways § 141.
17. Wolff v. City of Los Angeles, 49 Cal. App. 400, 193 Pac. 862, 863 (1920);
City of Stockton v. Marengo, 137 Cal. App. 760, 764, 31 P. 2d 467 (1934); Nelson
v. State Highway Board, 110 Vt. 44, 1 A. 2d 689, 118 A.L.R. 915 (1938); Elks v.
Board of Commissioners, 179 N. C. 241, 102 S. E. 414 (1920); Board of Supervisors
of Chenango County, 257 App. Div. 1058, 13 N. Y. Supp. 2d 730 (1939); People
v. Gianni, 130 Cal. App. 584, 20 P. 2d 87 (1933); Quin v. Mississippi State High-
way Commission, 194 Miss. 411, 11 So. 2d 810 (1943); In re Appointment of
Viewers,; Johnson, 344 Pa. 5, 23 A. (2d) 880 (1942).
18. Jones Beach Boulevard Estate v. Moses, note 16, supra.
19. 42 C. J. Motor Vehicles § 48.
20. Cavanaugh v. Gerk,'313 Mo. 375, 280 S. W. 51 (1926).
21. Grimes, The Legality of Parking Meter Ordinances and Permissible Use of
Parking Meter Funds, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 235-251 (1947); City of Clayton v.
Nemours, note 13, supra; Wilhoit v. Springfield, 237 Mo. App. 775, 171 S. W. 2d 95
(1943); State ex rel. Audrain County v. Mexico, 197 S. W. 2d 301 (1946);
Kimmel v. Spokane, 7 Wash. 2d 372, 109 P. 2d 1069 (1941); Rhodes v. Raleigh,
217 N. C. 627, 9 S. E. 2d 389, 130 A.L.R. 311 (1940).
22. 25 AM. Jum. Highways § 267, 5 AM. JuR. Automobiles § 48; 40 C.J.S. High-
ways § 233; Wilbur v. Newton, 301 Mass. 97, 16 N. E. 2d 86, 121 A.L.R. 570
(1938); State v. Swagerty (1907), note 2 supra; People v. Linde, 341 Ill. 269, 173
N. E. 361, 72 A.L.R. 997 (1930).
23. 5 AM. JuR. Automobiles § 49; Jones Beach Boplevard Estate v. Moses, note
16, supra; Cavanaugh v. Gerk, note 20, supra; 42 C. J. Motor Vehicles § 46.
24. Wilson v. Kansas City, 162 S. W. 2d 802 (1942).
[Vol. 13
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Compensation for change of grade is volunteered by the statutes or
charters controlling many cities. But. constitutions should not be held to
have created a new property right or easement-the legal right to have all
highways maintained at any partciular grade and so as not to obstruct light,
air, and view.12
C. Compensation under eminent domain,
but not under police power.
The converse of the individual's legal right is the public's legal duty.
The Federal Government is under the injunction of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution which says:
"... nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation."
Similarly, each of the states, because both (1) of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and (2) of its own state constitution, is under the requirement that
private property shall not be (1) taken or (under many state constitutions)
(2) legally damaged for public use without payment of just compensation.
These constitutional provisions have reference to taking or damaging
(1) property (2) for public use under the soveregin's power of eminent
domain. They do not apply if property which is, or is apt to become an
instrumentality of harm, is taken or damaged for public protection under
the sovereign's police power.1 8 Constitutions do not require payment of any
compensation when only police power is exercisedU Of course, those entrust-
ed with legislative power over the matter may (and often do) voluntarily
pay what no constitution compels them to pay.
1. Traffic regulation or limitation comes under police power.
It is often difficult to determine whether it is the eminent domain or the
police power which is being exercised in a particular case. However, it is well
12. See note 8, supra, and Gaus & Sons Mfg. Co., v. St. Louis, K. &. N. W.
Ry., 113 Mo. 308, 315, 318-319, 20 S. W. 658 (1892); S. B. Penick & Co., v. New
York Central R. R., N1 F. 2d 1006 (C.C.A. 3d 1940); Perlmutter v. Greene,
259 N. Y. 327, 182 N. E. 5, 81 A.L.R. 1543, 1547 (1932)-screening off view of a
valuable billboard.
13. In a sense, the first serves a positive purpose, the second a negative one.
For rationale of "The Police Power and the Right to Compensation," see 3 HARv.
L. Rav., 189-205 (1889). See also, 16 C. J. S. Constitutional Law §§ 175, 184; 29
C. J. S. Eminent Domain § 6; State ex rel. Penrose Investment Co. v. McKelvey,
301 Mo. 1, 256 S. W. 474 (1923); Bellerive Investment Co. v. Kansas City, 321
Mo. 969, 980-983, 13 S. W. 2d 628 (1929); City of Clayton v. Nemours, 353 Mo.
61, 65-66, 182 S. W. 2d 57 (1944), appeal dismissed, 323 U. S. 684 (1945).
14. Max v. Bamard-Bolckou Drainage District, note 8, supra; Bellerive In-
vestment Co. v. Kansas City and Eminent Domain, note 13, supra; 11 AM. JUR.
Constitutional Law § 266.
1948]
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coincidentally, a cul-de-sac exists for some arbitrarily selected distance from
the abutter's land.2t
We note in passing that, under Section 12 of the Federal Aid Highway
Act of 1944, Pub. L. 521, approved December 20, 1944, the Federal Govern-
ment is preparing to take over some police power on all state highways and
streets which receive federal aid in the future. This section provides that
"the Commissioner of Public Roads is hereby directed to concur only in
such installations (of traffic signs) as will promote safe and efficient utiliza-
tion of the highways"; and that "the location, form, and character of infor-
mational, regulatory, and warning, signs, curb and pavement or other
markings, and traffic signals installed or placed by any public authority,
or other agency" must become "subject to the approval of the State highway
department with the concurrence of the Public Roads Administration" if
that particular highway or street is to be constructed thereafter with federal
aid.
2. Regulation of place and manner of access under police power.
Generally an abutting owner may construct as many entrances to the
highway and at such places as he desires.2 8 But where reasonably necessary
for the maintenance of the highway or for the safety of the public, regulations
and restrictions may be imposed, under the police power, upon the right of
access (at least, provided they neither entirely nor unreasonably restrict it).
For example, no one would question a piohibition, under the police power,
of an abutter's gaining his access to a busy street, across a crowded sidewalk,
at 60 miles per hour. Places of entrance may be restricted by culvert head-
walls, drainage ditches, cuts, fills, sidewalk and curb regulations, fire hydrants;
telephone poles, and even commercialized parking meters.27 The type of
25. Bacich v. Board of Control of. Calif., 23 Cal. 2d 343, 366, 144 P. 2d 818,
832 (1943); People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 399, 144 P. 2d 799, 802, 807 (1943).
But see the better reasoning in the 'dissenting opinions. Perhaps the statutory
definition of property in California (CIVIL CODE, § § 658-662, as set out in the
Ricciardi opinion) creates new property rights which would not exist at common
law.
26. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Hoffman, State ex rel. State
Highway Commission v. Bailey, Brownslow v. O'Donoghue, and Highways, note 6,
svupra.
27. See note 21, above and State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. James,
205 S. W. 2d 534 (Mo. 1947); Alexander v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312, 321.
24 N. W. 2d 244, 250 (1946); Anzalone v. Metropolitan District Commission, 257
Mass. 32, 153 N. E. 325, 47 A.L.R. 897 (1926).
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construction of the entrance facility may also be regulated in the interest
of public safety.
28
3'. All claims, evidence and argument concerning damages from exercise
of police power and other non-compensable damages should be excluded.
It is well settled that, while particular statutes and city charters may,
constitutions do not require compensation for damages which are (1) com-
mon or which differ only in degree, and not in kind, from those suffered by
the community generally, 29 (2) for personal inconvenience, expense, or loss,
rather than for value of property taken or depreciation of property injured
directly for public use,80 (3) from loss of gratuitous privileges which have
been enjoyed on sufferance, not because of legal right,"' or (4) caused by an
exercise of the public power.8 2 Of course, all claims, evidence, and argument
concerning any such damages should be excluded by objection or instruction.
28. Shawne6 v. Robbins Bros. Tire Co., 134 Okla. 142, 272 Pac. 457, 66
A.L.R. 1047 (1928); Brownslow v. O'Donoghue, note 6 above.
29. Gilbert v. Greeley, S. L. & P. Ry., 13 Colo. 501, 22 Pac. 814 (1889);
Smith v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., note 8, supra; State Highway Commission v.
Chatham, 173 Miss. 427, 161 So. 674 (1935); Feltz v.'Central Nebraska P. P. &
I. Dist., 124 F. 2d 578, 583 (C.C.A. 8th 1942); City of Colorado Springs v.
Weiher, 110 Colo. 55, 129 P. 2d 988 (1942); Mandell v. Board of Commissioners, 44
N .Mex. 109, 99 P. 2d 108 (1940); Jamagin v. Louisiana Highway Commission,
5 So. 2d 660 (La. 1942); Nagel v. Lindell Ry., 167 Mo. 89, 98, 66 S. W. 1090
(1902); Rude v. St. Louis, 93 Mo. 408,'415, 6 S. W. 257 (1887); Chicago Great
Western R. R. v. Kemper, 256 Mo. 279, 295, 166 S. W. 291 (1914); Gates v. Kansas
City Bridge & T. Ry., 111 Mo. 28, 34-45, 19 S. W. 957 (1892).
30. St. Louis K. and N. W. R. R. v. Knapp-Stout & Co., 160 Mo. 396, 406,
411-415, 61 S. W. 300 (1901); Springfield S. W. Ry. v. Schweitzer, 173 Mo. App.
650, 655, 158 S. W. 1058 (1913); United States v. General Motors Corporation,
323 U. S. 373, 156 A.L.R.. 390 (1945); Beckham v. State, 64 Cal. App. 2d 487,
149 P. 2d 296, 303 (1944); Louisiana Highway Commission v. Boudeaux, 19 La.
App. 98, 139 So. 521 (1932); State Highway Board v. Willcox, 168 Ga..883, 149
S. E .182, 184, 185 (1929); In re Appointment of Viewers, note 17, supra; Lenhart
v. Commonwealth, 345 Pa. 528, 29 A. 2d 22 (1942); Wilkerson v. Grand River Dam
Authority, 195 Okla. 678, 161 P. 2d 745, 747 (1945); Pemberton v. City of Greens-
boro, 208 N. C. 466, 181 S. E. 258 (1935); Banner Milling Co. v. State, 117 Misc.
33, 191 N. Y. Supp. 143, 148, 149 (1921); State ex rel. State Highway Commission
v. Sharp, 62 S. W. 2d 928, 930 (Mo. App. 1933); State ex rel. State Highway Com-
mission v. Stoddard Gin Co., 62 S. W. 2d 940, 942 (Mo. App. 1933); State ex rel.
State Highway Commission v. Watkins, 51 S. W. 2d 543 (Mo. App. 1932); Deepe
v. United States, 103 Colo. 294, 86 P. 2d 242 (1938); State ex rel. State Highway
Commission v. Blobeck Investment Co., 233 Mo. App. 858, 863, 110 S. W. 2d 860
(1937).
31. Union Elevator Co. v. K. C. Suburban Belt R. R., 135 Mo. 353, 367-370,
36 S. W. 1071 (1896); Tate v. State Highway Commission, 226 Mo. App. 1216,
49 S. W. 2d 282 (1932); Gorgas v. Philadelphia, H. & P. R. R., 144 Pa. 1, 11, 22 At.
715 (1891); Ranlet v. Concord R. R., 62 N. H. 561, 563-564 (1883); Gillespie v.
Board of Commissioners, 47 Wyo. 1, 30 P. 2d 797, 801-802 (1934); Banner Milling
Co. v. State, and State Highway Board v. Willcox, note 30, rupra; In re Appoint-
ment of Viewers, note 17, .upra.
32. See notes, 13 and 14, supra.
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And, since they are not compensable, it should make no difference whether
any or all possible damages of the above character are foreseen at the time
the right-of-way is originally acquired.33
D. The abutting property owner's
right of access.
If the owner of one tract of land has the legal right to go upon and travel
over a second tract in the posession of another, he has what is known in law
as an "easement appurtenant," which is property or a property right. The
Restatement of Servitudes,s4 says:
"§ 450. An easement is an interest in land in the possession of
another which
"(a) entitles the owner of such interest to a limited use or
enjoyment of the land in which the interest exists; ...
"Comment: a... the land in which an easement exists consti-
tutes a servient tenement."
"§ 453. An easement is appurtenant to land when the easement
is created to benefit and does benefit the possessor of the land in his
use of the land."
"§ 507 ...Comment: a . Easements are property rights
and when the ownership of them is in private hands they are subject
to extinguishment as other property rights are through the exercise
of this power (of eminent domain).
"b ... The rights themselves are not appropriated; they are
merely extinguished ...
"c... For there to be an extinguishment it is only necessary
that the use permitted under the condemnation shall be inconsistent
with the continuance of the use authorized by the easement' existing
prior to the condemnation."
1. How does the abutter acquire his right-of-access property?
It would be both interesting and profitable to examine into how the
abutting landowner acquires his right-of-access property.
Back in the horse and cart days of early English or Colonial history,
neighboring landowners cleared or opened passage-ways through their woods
and fields so they could haul their produce to the nearst village, or perhaps
ride, instead of walk, to the village church or inn. I can remember the early
33. Hill-Behan Lumber Co. v. State Highway Commission, note 8, supra, and
The Julia Bldg. Assn. v. Bell Telephone C., 88 Mo. 258, 268-273 (1885).
34. See: Petition of Buraquist, 220 Minn. 48, 55, 19 N. W. 2d 394, 398(1945); State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. James, note 27, supra; 28 C.J.S.
Easements § § 1-4; 25 AM. JUR. Highways § 154; 39 C.J.S. Highways § 141.
19481
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years of this century in the Ozark hills of Missouri when a farmer located,
constructed, and maintained. a country road as if it were wholly his private,
road or property, to which, however, the public was always welcome-just
as any stranger was always welcome to drop in for a free meal or night's
lodging. Under such conditions it was naturally taken for granted that the
landowner who had contributed all construction and maintenance labor, as
well as right-of-way, should have the right of access to "his" road at any
place he pleased. Common understanding and common custom eventually
become common law.
But suppose all the costs of locating, designing, acquiring right-of-way,
constructing, and maintaining a highway are paid 'by the Pennsylvania
Turnpike Company, a private corporation engaged in selling transportation
service for a toll charge. Should Farmer Jones, who has contributed nothing,
have some right-of-access property in the tollroad, and the legal right of
toll-free access to, and use of that highway just because his farm happens
to abut on it?
Again, suppose all the costs of providing the highway were contributed
exclusively by another limited group-motor-vehicle-users. And suppose
Mr. Jones does all hi; farming and traveling with teams or road-tax-free
tractors and fuel. Did the motor-vehicle-users, turned Santa Claus, give
Mr. Jones a property right in the abutting road as a Christmas present,
and insist that he sue them for damages if he should fail to realize the fullest
possible enjoyment and use from his present?
Or, suppose two adjoining farms with a division fence between, one
owned by our old friend, Mr. Jones, and the other by Mr. Smith. A new
highway is located all upon Smith's land, but with its right-of-way line
coming just to Jones' land. Jones, of course, had no right to access across
the division fence to Smith's land before the highway was opened up. But
the day after the highway is opened, Smith finds he has suddenly become the
owner of a new property right. If he is thereafter denied access to the high-
way on Jones' land, he can go to court, and may recover several thousand
dollars-from Highway Users, of course, not from Mr. Smith-becausd his
property has been taken or damaged for public use, the exact amount of "his
recovery depending upon plaintiff's service demands upon the highway--
what use he might be making of his land at the time."'
35. Somewhat parallel to this, when we finally become fully aware of the
almost uiiversal assumption which has evolved during recent years concerning
employee rights and employer obligations, must we not recognize that ,another
[Vol. 13
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What a far cry one of our modern "superhighways" is from the old
horse and cart road. And often theretis just as great a difference between
the abutter's contributions to, and equities in, the two kinds of highways.
Except as an abutter has contributed something because he is an abutting
landowner-as distinguished from contributions to motor-v hicle-tax trust
funds for construction and maintenance of highways-how does he get, and
why should he have this legal right which attaches automatically because his
land abuts on a highway? Likewise, how does the legal duty become saddled
upon motor-vehicle users (1) to give him this property right and (2) to
pay "just compensation" if it is later withdrawn or limited?386
It may not be too late for some enterprising lawyer with a pioneering
urge to convince a state court that no constitution-given right really belongs
to abutters to demand this gift of property; and that there "is no correspond-
ing duty upon motor-vehicle-users to either give, or pay for, any such
property right on all highways.3
7
property right has grown up from common understanding-that, when his name
goes on the payroll a laborer acquires a property right in the machine with which he
works? If, without any fault of his, another is given his place at his machine, he may
collect full compensation-National Labor Relations Board v. Giannasca, 119 .F. 2d
756, 135 A.L.R. 560 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941). In fact, one who has never been employed
may force his name onto the payroll of a company which does not want him, and can
collect "back pay" for time before he went to work-Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
N.L.R.B., 313 U. S. 177, 133 A.L.R. 1217 (1941). In order that he may have his
machine with which to work, his employer may be compelled to reopen a business
which the employer does not wish to operate-N.L.R.B. v. Cape County Milling
Mo., 140 F. 2d 543, 152 A.L.R. 144 (C.C.A. 8th 1944); Williams Moor Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 128 F. 2d 960 (C.C.A. 8th 1942); Atlas Underwear Co. v. N.L.R.B. 116
F. 2d 1020, 1023 (C.C.A. 6th 1941); New York State Labor Relations Board v.
National Beauty Parlors, 180 Misc. 997, 45-N.Y.S. 2d 36 (1943) ("words of art,"
which laymen may consider legal "double-talk," may make a practice "which is
not unfair" become "an unfair labor practice"). And there is a rapidly growing
public feeling (not yet fully crystallized and defined in legislation, but reflected in
decisijons and orders of administrative agencies set up by legislation) that prices
and profits should be kept down by law, and that whatever additional income
(over a "reasonable" interest return on the capital invested) is realized from the
use of any labor-saving device should go to raise the living standards of the
machine's operator-not to enable the employer to "profiteer." Like the hen or
the egg controversy, do rights and privileges enjoyed from property create interests
and ownership, or does ownership create rights?
36. Few people appreciate how much earmarked motor vehicle revenue is
being diverted from motor-vehicle-use roads (and from being spent strictly for the
benefits of, and according to the needs of those who contribute), to land-use-roads
(and spent almost wholly to benefit and increase the market value of lands, the
owners of which may contribute little or nothing to the trust fund). See: HIGHWAY
REsEaRcn BoARD BULLEtIN No. 6, pp. 12-13.
37 See Justice Holmes' dissent in Muhlker v. New York and Harlem R. R.,
197 U. S. 544, 572-577 (1904). Also, Stanwood v. City of Maiden, 157 Mass. 17,
18 (1892)--"It would have been intelligible for the Legislature to say that, when
a benefit conferred upon a landowner, the value of which he does not pay for, he
1948]
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2. When does abutter acquire his access-right property?
An easier question is: When does the abutter's right-of-access property
come into legal existence? The answer is: When the highway is legally
opened to general public travel. Up to that time the locating power-the
legislature, the state highway commission, or the city fathers-may make
minor changes in, or even abandon, the particular location of the highway
past his land. 8
3. No injury to abutter's right of access where there is an
outer-roadway in front of his property.
As stated under I, above, the usual direct access is allowed between
abutting property and outer-roadways which are maintained for two-way
local traffic between the central thruway and the right-of-way line.
We should always keep in mind that, as pointed out under III, C, above,
the abutting property owner has no more legal right than has anyone else
to be free from police regulations of traffic after he has gained access to
some part of a highway. The abutter suffers no special damage (different
in kind, rather than degree) from regulation of traffic inside the highway
in front of his property. And he is entitled to no compensation for limiting
his access, since he has the usual right to access to the outer-roadway.
4. What value does access-right property have?
Constitutions require just compensation for private property taken or
damaged for public use. Such compensation must equal the loss in value of
the property to the owner-not its value to the public.1 D "Value," as used
takes it upon the implied condition that he shall not be paid for it when it is taken
away"; Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U. S. 315, 319, 83 A.L.R. 1429 (1932). But,
even if, it were admitted that a particular abutter owns right-of-access property,
will.not any limitation or control of that right of access be only because, and to
the extent, this property becomes dangerous to public safety and welfare, and,
therefore, be under the police power? Certainly it is not taken or damaged because
the public desires to itself enjoy the right of access between the highway and abut-
ting property-it is not for public use. See note 13, srupra.
38. See: Nairn v. Bean ("Individuals constituting State Highway Commis-
sion; its engineers and employees"), 48 S. W. 2d 584, 586, 587 (Tex. 1932); Board
of Commissioners of Canadian County v. State Highway Commissioners, 176 Okla.
"207, 55 P. 2d 106 (1936).
39. U. S. v. Honolulu Plantation Co., 122 Fed. 581, 584 (C.C.A. 9th 1903);
Thompson v. State, 204 App. Div. 684, 198 N. Y. Supp. 590 (1923); Black River
R. R. v. Barnard, 9 Hun. 104 (N. Y. 1876); In re Union Depot Street R. and R.
Co., 31 Minn. 297, 17 N. W. 626 (1883); U. S. v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 147 A.L.R.
55 (1943); U. S. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 281 (1943); St. Louis, K. & N. W.
R. R. v. Knapp-Stout & Co., note 30, supra; St. Louis v. Rossi, 333 Mo. 1092, 1102,
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here, does not include any intangible, speculative, sentimental, or social
values.40 Where ascertainable, the law recognizes only "market value"-
the cash price which the property would bring if it were sold.41
In an inquiry into the market value of right-of-access property, the
time element is one of the most important factors--"is of the essence."
Until the highway is opened to public travel the abutter does not have legal
title to any access-right property. The city slicker may have sold the
Brooklyn Bridge (which he didn't own) to the gullible stranger; but surely
no highway authority would be so gullible as to pay an abutter for access-
rights to a new highway which that same highway authority has not yet
given to the abutter.
Of course, after the public has once opened the road to traffic, and
has given this access-right property to the abutter, it then becomes a ques-
tion of fact and legal proof as to what price the new property would bring
on the market. To determine this amount we usually use the Archimedes
method. 42 We find the difference in market value of the abutting land,
40. Cane Belt Ry. v. Hughes, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 565, 72 S: W. 1020 (1903);
In re Edwards J. Jeffries Homes Housing Project, 306 Mich. 638, 11 N. W. 2d 272,
276 (1943); Potts v. Philadelphia, 28 Pa. Dist. 498, 500 (1915); Louisiana Highway
Commission v. Bordeaux, note 30, supra; State Highway Board v. Bridges, 60 Ga.
App. 240, 3 S. E. 2d 907, 910 (1939).
41. See cases in notes 39 and 40, supra. Anderson v. Cheaspeake Ferry Co.,
43 S. E. 2d 10 (Va. 1947), suggests that a state may pay only nominal, if any,
compensation for property from which an annual profit of nearly a half million dol-
lars can be realized (actually was realized by the state), provided the business is
strike- bound and cannot operate at the time of condemnation. Query: If a country,
subject to a constitution requiring payment of just compensation for all property
taken, should decide to socialize industry and transfer it from private to public
ownership, may those individuals who are in control of government at the time
legally deflate "market values" either (1) directly, by setting low rent and price
ceilings, or (2) indirectly, by conniving with, or allowing, organized bands of
private individuals to throw a wall around the property and exclude its owners,
employees, and customers? Must "market value" be set under (1) a free market,
and (2) police protection of person and property in good faith by the state? See
U. S. v. New Rivers Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341 (1923).
42. A favorite with physics teachers (and ex-teachers or problem-solving ad-
dicts) is the story of how the King demanded that Archimedes determine whether
a new crown was of pure gold, or whether it was adulterated with silver alloy.
Archimede could weigh a cubic centimeter of gold and find its density (or specific
gravity in the metric system) to be 19.3 grams, while the density of silver would
only be 10.53 grams per cubic centimeter. He also knew that if he divided the
mass (or, generally speaking, the weight) of the crown by its volume, and did not
get 19.3 grams (if using the metric system), it was not pure gold. But how measure
the volume of the intricately shaped crown? One day while in his bath he suddenly
thought of the answer and, without stopping to dress, he treated the market place
loafers of Syracuse to the spectacle of a grotesque little fat paunchy man running
panting through the street with no covering save his beard flapping in the breeze,
shouting, "Eureka, Eureka!" (I have found it!) It had just occurred to him that he
1948]
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first, sold with the right of access, and second, sold without it, just as
Archimedes measured the volume of water with, and without, the crown."
The value to the abutter of his right of access, once it has come into
existence, depends principally upon the use to which he can put his abutting
land-the highest use for which he can prove it is suitable at the time of
valuation. Thus, the value of the road does not depend upon the type of
road, but upon the type of property which abuts it-the demands which
the property makes upon the road for service. Often almost the entire value
of the abutting land was created by the road. Extinguishing all right of
access on one side might decrease very little the market value of a section
of cattle grazing land, if access is left to roads on the other three sides. But
the figure for loss of access to one side of property at the intersection of
Broadway and 42nd Street in New York City might be faintly reminiscent of
the national debt of a few decades ago.
It is always difficult for the untrained and inexperienced to set a fair
and just value on anything. Few of us have yet had any opportunity to
see what effect limiting access will have on property values. But within the
next 25 years millions of dollars will be paid out for extinguishing access
rights. Shall a scientific and factual basis be worked out for accurately and
fairly determining those values? Or, because it would require too much time,
effort, and money to make a scientific investigation beforehand of access
values and methods of evaluation, shall we depend upon rolling dice or some
other game of chance before juries? Shall we be penny wise, but pound
foolish?
It will take imagination, initiative, and perseverance to plan and carry
could measure the volume of the crown indirectly by measuring the volume of the
water which it would displace. This he could do either by (1) using a linear meas-
uring stick to get the cubic contents of water in a vessel of regular or easily
measurable shape (either one large vessel or a smaller vessel in which the quantity
of overflow from the larger vessel could be measured), first, without the crown, and
second, with the crown submerged in it, the apparent increase in the volume of
water being equal to the volume of the crown which displaced aud caused the water
to rise, or (2) weighing the crown, first, in the air, and second, submerged in water,
the difference in weight of the crown equalling the weight of an equal volume of
water which it had displaced-each gram lost indicating 1 cc. of water displaced.
43. 18 AM. JuR. Eminent Domain § 250; Re West Tenth St. v. Realty Corp.,
196 N. E. 30, 98 A.L.R. 634 (1935); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 740, 123 P. 2d
505 (1942); Andrews v. Cox, Highway Commissioner, 129 Conn. 475, 29 A. 2d
587 (1942); Pumphrey v. Tabler, State Road Commission, 175 Md. 498, 2 A. 2d
668, 671-672 (1938); Realty Improvement Co. v. Consolidated Gas E. L. & P. Co.,
156 Md. 581, 144 At. 710, 713 (1929); State Highway Board v. Bridges, note 40,
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through a worth while study of such values. Some of the states may not
have that kind of personnel. Such states might be able to save themselves
hundreds of thousands of dollars of excessive verdicts in their larger metro-
politan centers by bringing in, from the states which do make such studies,
expert witnesses or advisers who know, rather than speculate, about such
values.44
(a) Do not confuse severance damages with access damages.
We should not confuse severance damages, damages which result from
limiting access from one part to another part of a man's land, with damages
from limiting access to an abutting public Jiglwa y. A severance damage
does not come from the loss of any rights associated with highway; it
would have occurred just the same if the intervening strip had been taken
for any other use.
(b) May decrease special-benefits compensation.
In many states compensation for property taken (and in slightly fewer
states for consequential damages to property not taken) may be paid
either (1) in money or (2) in special benefits. Of course,, in proportion as
payment with new right-of-access property is decreased or eliminated, pay-
ment in money will have to increase. 4 However, as the years go by, it is
becoming more difficult to sell special benefits to the average jury. It may
be that the lack of special benefits to offer abutters and juries will become
increasingly less important in the future.
5. How may abutter's right of access be extinguished or
kept from ever coming into existence?
Of course, an abutter can always extinguish his right of access by his
own voluntary act. Since the right of access is an easement appurtenant to
Of course, all gratuitous privileges enjoyed by the property should be carefully
excluded, and the value before the taking should be decreased accordingly so it will
reflect only the value to which the owner is entitled by law. Likewise, the value
after the taking should reflect, on the one hand, (1) no increase by general benefits
from the public improvement (in those states which allow only special benefits
in payment for damages), and, on the other hand, (2) no general or other non-
compensable damages. Queeno v. State, 255 Misc. 941, 8 N. Y. Supp. 2d 855 (1938);
Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Prewitt, supra; State Highway Board
v. Bridges, note 40, supra; State ex tel. State Highway Commission v. Lindley, 232
Mo. App. 831, 838, 113 S. W. 2d 132 (1938); State ex tel. State Highway Commis-
sion v. Bailey, 234 Mo. App. 168, 175, 115 S. W. 2d 17 (1938); State ex Tel. State
Highway Commission v. Baumhoff, 230 Mo. App. 1030, 1037, 1043, 93 S. W. 2d
104 (1936).
44. See "Effect of Freeway Development on Adjoining Land Values in Cali-
fornia," note 5, supra.
45. See exhaustive annotation on special benefits in 145 A.L.R. 7-299 (1943)
and Missouri cases under note 43, supra.
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land, not one in gross or ai personal right which may be separated from the
land, it should be extinguished by a written instrument capable of being
recorded and dearly evidencing the abutter's intention-as against himself,
his heirs, successors, and assigns-to thereby either (1) renounce or extin-
guish it, or (2) convey the right to the public. 6
If a highway 'authority has power to design a highway so the safety of
the traveling public will require that certain land shall be taken; 47 and if
that *authority then has power to condemn "all right, title, and interest" in
that land; it is difficult to understand why there should be any question as
to such authority's power to design for, and condemn only so much of the
right, title, and interest as is necessary for public use. If it can condemn
the whole, it can condemn one of its parts. Why should the right of access
be singled out as the only right in land which is not subject to condemna-
tion?
Surely the sovereign has not lost its power to condemn this particular
kind of property simply because the need for it was only discovered within
the last decade. However, from the frequency with which we hear: "It has
been done this way before," or "it has never been done this way before," one
wonders if all lawyers and engineers are not direct descendants of those early
pork eaters which Charles and Mary Lamb tell about in their delightful
Dissertation on Roast Pig8
46. See: RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, §§ 497-506 (1944); Dyer v. Sanford,
50 Mass. 395, 402 (1845); Westlake v. Silva, 49 Cal. App. 2d 476, 121 P. 2d
872 (1942).
47. In 1945 Missouri adopted a new Constitution. The Constitutional Conven-
tion considered a proposal for Article IV, Section 29, which would spell out specif-
ically that the State Highway Commission has authority "to limit access to, from
and across state highways where the public interest and safety may require." But
certain-outside interests were ignorant of the meaning of (1) "legal right of access,"
and of (2) the distinction between (a) limiting access under eminent domain and(b) regulating traffic under the police power. One group feared that authority to
limit access meant authority to limit the size and weight of their busses and
trucks before they would be admitted to state highways. Another group feared
they might lose, without any right to compensation, their roadside commercial ven-
tures with large values built by, and dependent upon, the business of passing
motorists. These two groups got an amendment added which makes the Highway
Commission's authority "subject to such limitations and conditions as may be im-
posed by law."
48. Almost all state highway officials seem to assume that new 6ondemnation
statutes specifically mentioning "right of access" must be enacted. But see Burn-
quist v. Cook, note 34, above: Houston North Shore Ry. v. Tyrrell, 128 Tex. 248,
258, 98 S. W. 2d 786, 793, 108 A.L.R. 1508, 1517 (1936); State ex rel. Burrows v.
Superior Court, 48 Wash. 277, 93 Pac. 423 (1908); Northern Light & Power Co.
v. Stacher, 13 Cal. App. 404, 109 Pac. 896 (1910); St. Louis, K. & N. W. Ry. v.
Clark, 121 Mo. 169, 180-184, 190-194, 196-199, 25 S. W. 192 (1893); State ex rel.
State Highway Commission v. James, note 27, supra.
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But, you ask: If right-of-access property does not come into existence
until the highway is opened for use, how can it be condemned when the
right-of-way is secured-before this right exists and before it is owned by
anyone?
The Supreme Court of Missouri has said that: "The exercise of the
power of eminent domain has been delegated by the Legislature to the State
Highway Commission ... , but not to the courts. The condemnor in every
case, in the exercise of a discretion-not subject to judicial review, makes its
own appropriation of private property for public use. ' 49 It has also been
pointed out that the condemnor may determine, if in good faith, what is
reasonably necessary for public use, and, on the other hand, what rights
may be reserved or granted the property owner without unduly interfering
with the public use.50 The condemnor may stipulate, in aqcordance with the
needs of the public in a particular case, that a stockpass will be built under
the road for the benefit of the abutter without unduly interfering with the
public use( or will not be built); or that room partitions in a hotel will (or
will not) be restored for the owrier's benefit at the end of the public's tem-
porary use, i.e., the condemnor may stipulate what rights will (or will not)
be given the owner, and, in the words of the Clark opinion, "pays for what
it needs and takes, and the landowner is allowed all the damages which he
in fact sustains." If the law, in- the absence of contrary allegations in a
condemnation pleading, gave an abutter an easement of light, air and view
When the public needs to extinguish a property right in land, but the possessi6n
and use of the land is not desired-e.g., to extinguish the right to maintain an over-
head electric power line near-an airport runway-condemnation of that single prop-
erty right in the land (if necessary) would seem to be the logical procedure (just as
we condemn the limited right to borrow road material during construction. Causby
v. United States, 328 U. S. 256 (1945). But, instead of proceeding in such a direct
and obvious way to the desired end, Mo. CoNsr. Art. I, § 27 (1945) provides for
(1) condemnation of the fee simple title to the land; (2) placing the desired re-
striction upon the land; and (3) then selling the land, subject to the restriction,
back to the original owner (or others). If this provision is intended to authorize
so-called" "excess condemnation" (of property not needed), see, City of Cincinnati
v. Vester, 33 F. 2d 242 (C.C.A. 6th 1929), 68 A.L.R., 831 (1930), aff'd 281 U. S.
439 (1930), holding such a state constitution violates the Federal Constitution.
And neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth Amendment may be nullified by an
administrative agency's arrogant, contemptuous, and dishonest certification of its
official finding that the taking of certain property is necessary to carry out the
legislative mandate to it, when it is obvious to everyone that this is not true-United
States ex el. TVA v. Welch, 150 F. 2d 613 (C.C.A. 4th 1945).
49. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Day, 327 Mo. 122, 125, 35
S. W. 2d 37 (1931).
50. See St. Louis, K. & N. W. Ry. v. Clark, note 48, above, and U. S. v.
60,000 Square Feet of Land & Oakland Hotel, 53 F. Supp. 767, 770 (Cal. 1943).
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over a highway the instant it was opened, there is no doubt but the con-
demnor could stipulate in its pleadings its plans to construct a viaduct or
fill 100 feet high in front of the abutting property. In such a case it would
be more accurate to say that the condemnor would thereby keep these
easements from ever coming into existence, rather than to say the ease-
ments, not yet in existence, were being condemned.
6. When should legal rights of access be extinguished
or kept from coming into existence?
Certainly the most access-right property can be extinguished or kept
from coming into existence for the least money before a highway is opened
on a new location-before the new property right is created and given to the
abutter. Once the gift of property is completed, new and more valuable
uses of the abutting land will usually grow with the increase in volume of
traffic past the land, and the value of access-rights will grow accordingly.
It would, therefore, seem that the best time to extinguish, or cause any
legal right of access to abort, is the earliest possible time-preferably, before
the road is opened.5 '
The emphasis in the last sentence is upon "legal rigkt." The statute
of limitations ordinarily does not run against the public. A right may exist
without being exercise to the fullest at all times. If there is any probability
whatever that it will ever be desirable to limit access to a new highway
location, why not extinguish the right of access while it will cost nothing, or
the least possible-before the highway is opened, and the right created?
If there is no reason for enforcing limitation during the first few years, don't.
Just file the legal right away until such time as it is needed, then bring it
out and exercise it only when and as it becomes reasonably necessary for
the public welfare. 2
51. 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 153; United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369,
147 A.L.R. 55 (1942); Vey v. City of Fort Worth, 81 S. W. 2d 228, 230-231 (1935).
As to the power to condemn for prospective, rather than immediate needs, see RE-
STATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 507 comment d; 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 92; St.
Louis R. Co. v. Foltz, 52 Fed. 627, 633 (1892); Heger v. City of St. Louis, 323
Mo. 1031, 20 S. W. 2d 665 (1929); Cochran v. Cavanaugh, 252 S. W. 284, 286
(Tex. Civ. App. 1923); 18 AM. JUR. Eminent Domain § 111. "No constitutional
right of the abutting landowners is invaded by the exercise of the right acquired by
the public but suffered to lie dormant for a time."--Peabody v. Boston, 220 Mass.
376, 378, 107 N. E. 952, 953 (1915).
52. 34 AM. JuR. Limitation of Actions § 388; Mo. REv. STATS. § 1011 (1939);
Bowzer v. State Highway Commission, 170 S. W. 2d 399, 403 (Mo. 1943); Columbia
v. Bright, 179 Mo. 441, 454, 79 S. W. 151 (1904); St. Louis v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 114
Mo. 13, 24 (1893).
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7. How enforce right to limit access when proper time comes?
Of course, it is possible to create physical barriers to access. This may
be done at the time of original construction by elevating or depressing the
grade above or below abutting property or iritersecting highways. Fences
or walls can be constructed at any time. However, we should not allow such
physical obstructions to lull us into a mistaken assumption that an abutter
may not build his own entrance or sue for damages provided his access rights
have not been extinguished by law.5'
But physical barriers are not the only way to limit access. In 1943 I
drew a proposed bill to set up in Missouri a legal procedure for enforcing
limitation of access. [t would have provided (1) for the State Highway
Commission to prepare, approve, and file for public information with the
county clerks in several counties, maps showing the locations and details
of all limitations of access and control of traffic on state highways in the
respective counties; (2) als6 for the commission to cause signs, conforming
to the information shown on the map, to be erected and maintained so as
to indicate the permissible 'places, manner,I and extent of access to and from
the highway, and movements on and between its traffic lanes; and (3)
making it a misdemeanor for any person to proceed to, from, or over the
highway contrary to such signs.54
Since Missouri does not yet have any limited access highways, nothing
was lost because that proposal was not enacted into law. And, with more
study and understanding, both by the State Highway Department and by
the public, a better bill can be drawn when the need for enforcement becomes
acute.
CONCLUSION
Highway officials are just becoming aware of one of the most important
and revolutionary of modem highway developments-limitation of access.
Much education is necessary before more officials (and most of the public)
become either interested or informed.
Naturally there are still unanswered engineering, legal, and right-of-way
questions. I have sought to suggest an approach for breaking down what
53. See note 6, supra.
54. See STATE TRAFFIC COMMISSION OF NEW YORK, VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW,
Art. 7, § 95-95k; State v. Dixon, 335 Mo. 478, 73 S. W. 2d 385 (1934); Ashland
Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S. W. 2d 691, 87 A.L.R.
534 (1932); 25 AM. JupL Highways § 256; 11 AM. JUR. Constitutional Law § § 238-
244; 40 C.J.S. Highways § 232; Mo. REv. STATS. § 8758 (1939).
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is now a new legal problem into several more simple and familiar questions
-to perhaps provoke some controversy, thought, and better final develop-
ment.
But the need for solutions is more urgent than we may think. Every
year we postpone the extinguishment of access rights-especially on new
locations-the greater the eventual cost of such extinguishment becomes,
and the more public trust funds must be needlessly dissipated. And who
knows when your number or mine may be up to become one of the 50% to
75% of highway fatalities which could have been prevented 'by limited-access
highways, or for our life savings to be wiped out as part of the 2-billion dollar
annual highway-accident property-loss?
Imagination and vision are needed. How appropriate here is the Biblical
quotation inscribed on the walls of Missouri's Capitol:
"Where there is no vision the people perish."
APPENDIX
EVOLUTION OF MISSOURI's MAJOR HIGHWAY LAWS DUE TO DEVELOPMENT
OF MOTOR VEHICLES
In 1903, with a total of 640 motor vehicles owned in the state, Missouri
adopted the Act set out in State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517 (1907), note 2,
supra, Mo. Laws .1903, p. 162. It set up a state speed limit of 9 miles per
hour; prescribed certain conduct when approaching carriages, wagons, women,
children, etc.; and required the buying of a local annual license for $2.00.
In 1907, with 3,940 motor vehicles, Mo. Laws 1907, pp. 74-79, Mo. REV.
STATS. c. 83 (1909), required all motor vehicles and "auto drivers" to be
registered, paying fees of $5 and $2, respectively, the vehicle's permanent
number to be fixed on it, while the driver had to wear his number "upon his
clothing in a conspicuous place at all times" while driving, as well as "keep
a vigilant watch for all vehicles, carriages, or wagons drawn by animal or
animals, and especially vehicles, carriages, or wagons driven by women or
children, and shall .. . stop and remain stationary, and shall, if requested,
stop the engine of such motor vehicle.., and shall not in any event, while
upon any public highway, run at a greater rate of speed than 15 miles an
hour,... and within the limits of all cities, towns, and villages the rate of
speed shall not be greater than 8 miles per hour in the business portion.... "
Mo. Laws 1907, pp. 407-408, authorized a State Highway Engineer "to
be appointed by and to be under the general supervision of the State Board
of Agriculture." He was to hold public meetings, gather and disseminate
information, and "superintendent the construction of demonstration roads in
any county whenever requested to do so by those having authority in road
construction." His $2,400-salary and all expenses of operating were paid
from an appropriation of $6,000 per year.
Under. the "Inter-County Seat Road Law," Mo. Laws 1913, pp. 8,
697-699, when there were 33,310 motor vehicles in the state a State High-
way Department was created with a $3,000 a year State Highway Commis-
sioner, a $2,000 Deputy Highway Commissioner, and a total appropriation
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of $8,000 per yedr. With the consent and assistance of the road construction
officials of the several counties the commissioner could establish "standard
gauge roads by prescribing the width of the roadbed, also the grade, also
the risb in elevation per rod." But his chief duties were "to visit the counties
of the state when requested and address public meetings on the subject of
construction and improvement of public roads" and generally act as a good-
roads publicity and propaganda agent.
In 1917, the number of motor vehicles in the state had increased to
147,528. By the "Haws Law," Mo. Laws 1917, p. 485-492, "assent" was
given to the Federal Aid Act passed by Congress the previous year; a 4-
member, bipartisan State Highway Board and a State Highway Engineer
were authorized; a 3,500-mile system of "state roads" was to be selected by
the engineer and the board; right-of-way should not be less than 40 feet;
counties and civil subdivisions could submit surveys and project state-
ments to the United States Secretary of Agriculture through the State High-
way Engineer; counties could construct their "state road" by day labor;
a 'State Road Fund" was set up to receive proceeds from (1) state motor
vehicle registration fees, (2) option stamp sales, and (3) corporation regis-
tration fees.
Under the "Morgan-McCullough Amendment," Mo. Laws 1919, pp.
650-660, Mo. REv. STATS. § 10,889-10,910 (1919) when there were 244,363
motor vehicles, it was intended "that there shall be expended by the State
Highway Board on such (6,000 miles of) state roads in each county (during
the years 1919, 1920, and 1921) the suit of $1,200 per, mile without cost
to the county and out of the funds derived from the Federal government and
the state road funds." It provided for a State Highway Superintendent (and
ex-officio Secretary,) to be under the State Highway Board, a State Highway
Engineer under the Superintendent, and First and Second Assistant Engi-
neers under the State Highway Engineer. The cost of all surveys and plans
coudl not exceed $100 per mile on the average and should be taken from
the $1,200 per mile. Construction was to be under contracts awarded by
the several counties.
Under the campaign slogan: "Get Missouri Out of the Mud," and with
346,838 motor vehicles, a Coristitutional Amendment, Mo. Laws 1921, p.
707, was adopted November 2, 1920, (1) authorizing $60,000,000 of bonds
for road construction and (2) earmarking motor-vehicle registration fees to
"stand appropriated without legislative action for and to the payment of
the principal" (but not interest). At a special election on August 2, 1921,
the Constitution was again amended to allow motor vehicle registration fees
to be used for payment of road bond interest, as well as principal. Mo. Laws
1921, 1st Extra Session, p. 196, Mo. CoNsT., Art. IV, Sec. 44a.
Two days later the Centennial Road Law, Mo. Laws 1921, 1st Extra
Session, pp. 131-167, Mo. REv. STAT. § 8740-8783 (1939), was approved. It
provided for a State Highway Commission, a Secretary, a Chief Engineer, a
Legal Advisor, and such assistants and employees, as may be necessary;
gave the commission very large and comprehensive discretionary powers to
locate, construct, and maintain a "state highway system" consisting of (1)
approximately 6,000 miles of secondary roads to pass through certain desig-
nated points in each county, and (2) approximately 1,500 miles of primary
roads. The apportionment of state and federal funds for construction was
raised from $1,200 for "earth roads of substantial character," as under former
law, to $6,000 for a "properly bound gravel road ...of at least 12 feet in
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surface width" on secondary roads, and over $20,000 on "higher type"
primary. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 8426 (1939).
When it was discovered that money was needed for naintenace and
also desirable to supplement bond proceeds for construction, while income
from registration fees exceeded many times the requirement for road bond
interest and principal, new § 44a, Article IV of the Constitution was relaxed
by an amendment of Section 4, Article X, on November 7, 1922 (Mo. Laws
1923, p. 392), to allow such excess of registration fees to be used for main-
tenance and construction.
The present 2-cent rate for motor vehicle fuel tax, together with an
increase in registration fees, was adopted by initiative on November 4, 1924,
Mo. Laws 1925, pp. 282-290, Mo. REv. STAT. § 8411-8442 (1939).
On November 6, 1928, with 712,965 motor vehicles registered, an. addi-
tional bond issue of $75,000,000 was voted in Constitutional Amendment
of Art IV, § 44a. It also provided that "all state motor vehicle registration
fees, license taxes or taxes authorized by law on motor vehicles (except the
property tax on motor vehicles and state license fees or taxes on motor
vehicle common carriers) and also all state taxes on the sale or use of
motor vehicle fuels authorized by law, less the expense of collection ...
shall . . . be and stand appropriated without legislative action" to the state
highway purposes, set out therein in great detail for administration by the
State Highway Commission under very large constitutional discretionary
powers. This is continued, with some changes, in the present 1945 Constitu-
tion, Art. IV, § 29-34.
The highest registration of motor vehicles in Missouri was 984,626
(1941). With manufacture of motor vehicles restricted during the war, this
figure had dropped to 854,291 in 1945.
A statute for state aid to county roads (sometimes called the County
Aid Road Law, Milk Route Law, or King Bill), Mo. Laws 1945, pp. 1472-
1475, approved July 23, 1946, as amended, p. 1503, provides for the state
to apportion from its General Revenue Fund to the several counties certain
money to be used ip matching, up to $750 per mile, equal amounts raised
locally for improvement of certain county roads. Approximately one half
million dollars of state money has been spent under this, and an additional
one million obligated in all but 9 counties of the state. It is now estimated
that the cost of loose gravel surfacing alone (cost of grading and draining
having been previously paid from other sources) in some one-fourth of theprojects is equalling or exceeding $1500 per mile.
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